Chapter 9 – Affirmation (part 1)
9. Affirmation
Many able writers in their efforts to solve the problem presented by the moral impotency and yet moral responsibility of fallen man, had recourse to the distinction between natural and moral ability and inability. They did not see how a man could be held accountable for his actions unless he was in some sense capable of performing his duty. That capability they ascribe as his being in possession of all the faculties requisite for the performance of obedience to the Divine Law. But it is now clear to us that these men employed the wrong term when they designated this possession of faculties a “natural ability,” for the simple but sufficient reason that fallen man has lost the power or strength to use those faculties aright, and it is surely a misuse of terms to predicate “ability” of one who is without strength. To affirm that the natural man possesses ability of any sort is really a denial of his total depravity.
In the second place, it should be pointed out that the moral inability or impotency of the natural man is not brought about by any external compulsion. It is an utterly erroneous idea to suppose that the natural man possesses or may posses a genuine desire and determination to do that which is pleasing unto God and to abstain from what is displeasing to Him, but that a power as extra, something outside himself, thwarts him and obliges him to act contrary to his inclinations. Were such the case man would be neither a moral agent nor responsible creature. If some physical law operated upon man (like that which regulates the planets), if some external violence (like the wind) carried men forward where they desired not to go, they would be exempted from guilt. Those who are compelled to do what they are decidedly averse to could not be justly held accountable for such actions.
One of the essential elements of moral agency is that the agent acts without external compulsion, in accord with his own desires. The mind must be capable of considering the motives to action which are placed before it and choosing its own course-by “motives” we mean those reasons or inducement which influence choice and action. Thus, that which would be a powerful motive to the view of one mind would be no motive at all in the view of another. The offer of a bribe would be sufficient inducement to move one judge to decide a case contrary to evidence and law; while to another such an offer, so far from being a motive for wrong doing, would be highly repellent. The temptation presented by Potiphar’s wife, which was firmly resisted by Joseph, would have been an inducement sufficiently powerful to have ruined many a youth of less purity of heart.
It should be quite evident, then, that no external motive (inducement or consideration) can have any influence over our choices and actions except so far as they make an appeal to inclinations already existing within us. The affections of the heart act freely and spontaneously: in the very nature of the case we cannot be compelled either to love or hate any object. Neither an infant nor an idiot is capable of weighing motives or of discerning moral values, and therefore they are not accountable creatures, amenable to law. But because man, though fallen and under the dominion of sin, is still a rational being, possessed of the power to ponder the motives set before his mind and to decide between good and evil, he is fully accountable, for he freely chooses that which, on the whole, he most prefers. Moral agency can only be destroyed by a force from without obliging man to act contrary to his nature and inclinations.
There is nothing outside of man which imposes upon him any necessity of sinning or which prevents him turning from sin to holiness. There is no force brought to bear immediately upon man’s power of volition, or even upon the connection between his volitions and his actions, which obliges him to follow the course he does. No, what man does ordinarily he does voluntarily or spontaneously in the uncontrolled exercise of his own faculties. No compulsion whatever is imposed upon him. He does evil, nothing but evil, simply because he chooses to do so: the only immediate and direct cause of his doing evil is that he so wills it. Therefore since man is a responsible creature, who, without any external power forcing him to act contrary to his desires freely rejects the good and chooses the evil, he must be held accountable for his criminal conduct.
We submit that what has been pointed out above considerably relieves the difficulty presented by the impotency of fallen man to meet the just requirements of God, and that if the reader will carefully ponder the same it should be apparent to him that the problem of human inability and accountability is by no means so formidable as at first sight appears. The case of the fallen creature is seen to be vastly altered once it is clearly defined what his impotency does not consist of. It makes a tremendous difference that his inability to obey his Maker lies not in the absence of those faculties by which obedience is performed. So, too, the complexion of the case is radically changed when we perceive that man is not the victim of a hostile power outside of himself which forces him to act contrary to his own desires and inclinations.
It will thus be evident that so far from fallen man being an object of pity because of his moral impotency, he is justly to be blamed for the course which he pursues. We do not condemn a man without legs because he is unable to walk, but rightly commiserate him. We do not censure a sightless man for not admiring the beauties of Nature, rather does our compassion go out unto him. But how different is the case of the natural man in connection with his bounden obligations to serve and glorify his rightful Lord! He is in possession of all the requisite faculties, but he voluntarily misuses them, deliberately following a course of madness and wickedness, and for that he is most certainly culpable. His guiltiness will appear yet more plainly as we behold what his moral impotency does consist of, when we consider the several elements which comprise it.
A further word needs to be added to the brief statement previously upon the error of affirming that fallen man possesses a natural “ability” to obey God. Most of the writers who so affirm take the ground that all the natural man lacks in order to perform that which is pleasing to God is a willingness so to do, that since his mental and moral endowments are admirably suited to the substance of the Divine commandments, that since man is still possessed of every faculty which is required for the discharge of his duty, he could obey God if he would. But this is far from being the case: the condition of fallen man is much worse than that. He not only will not, but he cannot please God. Such is the emphatic and unequivocal teaching of Holy Writ, and it must be held fast by us at all costs, no matter what difficulties it may seem to involve. Yet we are fully convinced that this cannot, does not in the least measure, annul man’s responsibility or render him any less blameworthy than was sinless Adam in committing his first offense.
“Unto them that are defiled and unbelieving is nothing pure: but even their mind and conscience is defiled” (Titus 1:15). In the unregenerate the mind and conscience are under an inherent and universal incapacity to form a right judgment or come to a right decision in regard to things pertaining to God, and as pertaining to Him. It is not merely that they are in the condition of one with a thick veil before his eyes, while the sight organs themselves are sound and whole, but rather are they like one whose eyes are diseased-weakened, decayed in their very internal organism. A diseased physical eye may be able to receive some glimmerings of light (through darkened glasses) yet be incapable of giving safe direction. But the eyes of fallen man’s heart and understanding are so seriously affected that they cannot receive or even tolerate any spiritual light at all, until the great Physician heals them.
The solemn and terrible fact is that the brighter and more glorious is the Divine light shed upon the unregenerate, the more offensive and unbearable it is to them. The eyes of our understanding are radically diseased, and it is the understanding-under false views and erroneous estimates of things-which misleads the affections and the will. How, then, can we with the slightest propriety affirm that man still possesses a “natural ability” to receive God’s Truth to the saving of his soul? In man as created there was a perfect adaptation of faculties and capability of receiving the Divine testimony. But in man fallen, though there be a suitableness in the essential nature of his faculties to receive the testimony of God-so that his case is far superior to that of the brute beast-yet his ability to use those faculties and actually to receive God’s testimony unto suitable ends, is completely deranged and destroyed.
The entrance of sin into man has done far more than upset his poise and disorder his affections: it has corrupted and deranged his whole being. His intellectual faculties are so impaired and debased that his understanding is quite incapable of discerning spiritual things in a spiritual manner. His heart (including the will), which is the practical principle of operation, is “desperately wicked” and in a state of “blindness” (Ephesians 4:18). Fallen man is not only negatively ignorant, but positively opposed to light and convictions. To say that the natural man could please God if he would is false: his impotency is insurmountable to will good, for he lacks the nature or disposition to will well. Therefore many men have greatly erred in supposing that the faculties of man are as capable now of receiving the testimony of God as they were before the Fall.
Unwillingness is not all which the Scriptures predicate of fallen man: they declare sin has so corrupted his being that he is rendered completely incapable of holy perceptions and that it has utterly disabled him to perform spiritual acts. “You have seen all that the Lord did before your eyes, in the land of Egypt unto Pharaoh and unto all his servants, and unto all his land: the great temptations which your eyes have seen, the signs and those great miracles. Yet the LORD has not given you a heart to perceive, and eyes to see, and ears to hear unto this day” (Deuteronomy 29:2-4)-the faculties were there, but they had not obtained power from God to perceive. “And the LORD heard the voice of your words when you spoke unto me; and the LORD said unto me, I have heard the voice of the words of this people, which they have spoken unto you: they have well said all that they have spoken. O that there were such a heart in them that they would fear Me, and keep all My commandments always, that it might be well with them and with their children forever” (Deuteronomy 5:28, 29)-the faculties were there, but they lacked the spiritual power to use them. The unregenerate is utterly disabled by indwelling sin in all the faculties of his spirit and soul and body from thinking, feeling, or acting any spiritual good toward God.
Yet the facts pointed out above do not to the slightest degree destroy or even lessen man’s responsibility to glorify his Maker. This will the more fully appear as we now consider what man’s impotency actually consists of. First, it is a voluntary inability. It was so originally: Adam acted freely when he ate of the forbidden fruit, in consequence whereof he lost his native holiness and became in bondage to evil. Nor can his descendants justly murmur at their inheriting the depravity of their first parents and being made answerable for their inability to will or do good, as part of the forfeiture penalty due the first transgression, because their moral impotency consists of their own voluntary continuation of Adam’s offense. The entire history of sin lies in inclination and self-determination. It must not be supposed for a moment that after the first sin of Adam all self-determination ceased.
“Original sin, as corruption of nature in each individual, is only the continuation of the first inclining away from God. The self-determination of the human will from God to the creature, as an ultimate end, did not stop short with the act in Eden, but goes right onward to every individual of Adam’s posterity, until regeneration reverses it. As progressive sanctification is the continuation of that holy self-determination of the human will which begins in its regeneration by the Holy Spirit, so the progressive depravation of the natural man is the continuation of that sinful self-determination of the human will which began in Adam’s transgression” (W. G. Shedd).
Thus the very origin and nature of man’s inability unto good demonstrates that it cannot annul his responsibility; it was self-induced and is now self-perpetuated. So far from human depravity being a calamity for which we are to be pitied, it is a crime for which we are righteously to be blamed. So far from sin being a weakness or innocent infirmity arising from some defect of creation, it is a hostile power, a vicious enmity against God. The endowments of the creature placed him under lasting obligation to his Creator, and that obligation cannot be cancelled by any subsequent action of the creature. If Man has deliberately destroyed his power, he has not destroyed his obligation. God does man no wrong in requiring from him what he cannot now perform, for by his own deliberate act of disobedience man deprived himself and his posterity of that power, and his posterity’s consent to Adam’s act of disobedience by deliberately choosing and following a similar course of wickedness.
But how can man be said to act voluntarily when he is impelled unto evil by his own lusts? Because he freely chooses the evil. This calls for a closer definition of freedom or voluntariness of action. A free agent is one who is at liberty to act according to his own choice, without compulsion or restraint from without. And have not fallen men this liberty? Does he, in any instance, break God’s Law by compulsion-against his inclinations? If it were true that the effect of human depravity was to destroy free agency and accountability, then it would necessarily follow that the more depraved or vicious a man becomes, the less capable he is of sinning, and that the most depraved of all would commit the least sin of any-which is too absurd to need refutation.
Though on the one hand it is a fact that fallen man is the slave of sin and the captive of the devil, yet on the other it is equally true that he is still a voluntary and accountable agent. Man has not lost the essential power or choice, or he would cease to be man. Though in one sense he is impelled Hell-wards by the downward trend of his depravity, yet he elects to sin, himself consenting thereto. Though the rectitude of our will is lost, nevertheless we still act spontaneously. “The soul of the wicked desires evil” (Proverbs 21:10), and for that he is to be blamed. If a man picked your pocket and when arrested said, “I could not help myself: I have a thievish disposition, I am obliged to act according to my nature,” his judge would reply, All the more reason you should be in prison.
Because fallen man posses the power of choice and is a rational creature, he is obligated to make a wise and good choice. The fault lies entirely at his own door that he does not do so, for he deliberately chooses the evil. “They have chosen their own ways, and their soul delights in their abominations. I also will choose their delusions, and will bring their fears upon them: because when I call, none did answer: when I spoke, they did not hear: but they did evil before Mine eyes, and chose that in which I delighted not” (Isaiah 66:3, 4). The bondage of the will to sinful inclinations neither destroys voluntariness nor our responsibility, for the enslaved will is still a self-determining faculty, and therefore under inescapable obligations to choose what man knows to be right. That very bondage is culpable, for it proceeds from self and not from God. Though man is the slave of sin it is a voluntary servitude, and therefore is it inexcusable.
The will is biased by the disposition of the heart: as the heart is, so the will acts. A holy will has a holy bias and therefore is under a moral necessity of exerting holy volitions: “a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit.” But a sinful will has a sinful bias because it has an evil disposition and therefore is it under a moral necessity of exerting sinful volitions. But let it be pointed out once more that the evil disposition of man’s will is not the effect of some original defect in the creature, for God made man “upright.” No, his very sinful disposition is the abiding self-determination of the human will. Its origin is due to the misuse Adam made of his freedom, and its continuation results from the unceasing, self-determination of everyone of his posterity. Each man perpetuates and prolongs the evil started by his first parents.
Because man must act according to the state of his heart, does this destroy his freedom? Certainly not, for “acting according to his heart” is simply another way of saying that he does as he pleases. And doing as we please is the very thing in which all free agency consists. The pulse can beat and the limbs can act in bodily disorders, whether we will them to or not. We should, with good reason, consider ourselves harshly dealt with if we were blamed for such actions; nor does God hold us accountable for them. A good man’s pulse may beat as irregularly in sickness as the worst villain’s in the world, or his hands may strike convulsively those who seek to hold him still. For such actions as these we are not accountable because they have no moral value: no evil inclination of ours, or the lack of a good one, is necessary in order to them-they are independent of us.
If all our actions were involuntary and out of our power, no ways necessarily connected with our disposition, our temper of mind, our choice, then we should not be accountable creatures or the subjects of moral government. If a good tree could bring forth evil fruit and a corrupt tree good fruit, if a good man out of the good treasure of his heart could bring forth evil things, and an evil man out of his evil treasure good things, the tree could never be known by its fruits. In such a case all moral distinctions would be at an end, moral government would cease to be, for men could no longer be dealt with according to their works-rewarded for the good and punished for the evil. The only man who is justly held accountable for reward or punishment is one whose actions are properly his own, dictated by himself, and which could not take place without his consent.
Here, then, is the answer to the objection that if fallen man is obliged to act according to the evil bias of his heart, he cannot rightly be termed a free agent: that necessity and choice are incompatible. Any inability to act otherwise than agreeably to our own minds would be an inability to act other than as free agents. But that necessity which arises from, or rather consists in, the temper and choice of the agent himself, is the very opposite of acting against his nature and freedom. The sinner acts freely because he consents, even when irresistibly influenced by his evil lusts. Of Christ we read, “the Spirit drives Him into the wilderness” (Mark 1:12), which indicates a forcible motion and powerful influence: yet of this same action of the Savior’s we are also told, “Then was Jesus led up of the Spirit in the wilderness” (Matthew 4:1), which plainly signifies His freedom of action. So, too, the Christian is both “drawn” and “taught” of God (John 6:44, 45): liberty of his will yet the victorious efficacy of Divine grace are united together.
Second, fallen man’s inability is a moral, and not a physical or constitutional one. Unless this be clearly perceived we shall be inclined to turn our impotency into an excuse or ground of self-extenuation. Men will be ready to say: Even though I possess the requisite faculties for the discharge of my duty, yet if I am powerless then I cannot be blamed for not doing it. A person who is paralyzed possesses all the members of his body, but he lacks the physical power to use them and no one condemns him for his helplessness. It needs, then, to be made plain that when the sinner is said to be morally and spiritually “without strength,” his case is entirely different from that of one who is paralyzed physically. The normal or ordinary natural man is not without either mental or physical strength to use his talents: what he lacks is a good heart, a disposition to love and serve God, a desire to please Him, and for that lack he is justly blamable.
The mental and moral faculties with which man are endowed, despite their impaired condition, lay him under moral obligation to love and serve his Creator. The illustrious character and perfections of God make it unmistakably manifest that He is infinitely worthy of being loved and served and therefore we are bound to love Him, which is what a good heart essentially consists of. There is no way of evading the plain teaching of Christ in the parable of the talents on this subject: “you ought therefore to have put My money to the exchangers, and at My coming I should have received Mine own with usury” (Matthew 25:27), which, in the light of the immediate context, clearly means that man ought to have had an heart to have improved to the best advantage (used aright) the talents which were committed to him.
The inability of the natural man to meet the holy and just requirements of God consists in the opposition of his heart to Him, and this because of the presence and prevalence of a vicious and corrupt disposition. Men know that God does not require from them a selfish and wicked heart, and they also know that He has the right to require from them a good and obedient heart. To deny that God has the right to require a holy and good heart from fallen man would be tantamount to saying He had no right to require anything from them, and then it would follow that they were incapable of sinning against Him. For if God had no right to require anything from man, man would not be guilty of disobedience against God. If God has no right to require a good heart from man, then He has no right to require him to do anything which man is unwilling to do, which would render him completely innocent.
A child has no right to complain of a parent for requiring him to do what he has faculties to perform, but for which he has no heart. A servant has no right to complain of a master for reasonably requiring him to do what his endowments fit him to perform, but for which he is unwilling. A subject has no right to complain for a ruler requiring him to perform that which the good of his country demands, and which he is capacitated to render, merely because he lacks the disposition to do it. All human authority supposes a right to require that of men which they are qualified to perform, but have no heart unto. How much less reason, then, have those who are the subjects of Divine authority to complain of being required to do what their faculties fit them for but which their hearts hate. God has the same supreme right to command a cordial and universal obedience from Adam’s posterity as He has from the holy angels in Heaven.
